Tomorrow, President Barack Obama is scheduled to deliver a speech about the Iraq War. August 31 marks the official end to combat operations in a war that has dragged on for more than seven years.

President George W. Bush May 1, 2003

President George W. Bush May 1, 2003

It’s also been seven years since President George W. Bush delivered his famous “Mission Accomplished” speech on May 1, 2003. “Major combat operations in Iraq have ended,” Bush boasted. “In the Battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.”

Obama won’t be landing on any air craft carriers wearing a military uniform costume and boasting about victory. In fact, it’s difficult to imagine the end to the Iraq War as a victory. Since the war began in March 2003, “victory” has never been defined.

What Obama will talk about are the sacrifices that the soldiers made for their country. They were asked to fight and die in Iraq, and nearly 4,500 soldiers have been killed and close to 32,000 wounded.

Obama most likely won’t mention that he never supported the war. In 2002, Illinois Senator Obama gave a speech at an anti-war rally in Chicago and said, “I don’t oppose all wars. What I am opposed to is a dumb war. What I am opposed to is a rash war. What I am opposed to is the cynical attempt by Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz and other armchair, weekend warriors in this administration to shove their own ideological agendas down our throats, irrespective of the costs in lives lost and in hardships borne.”

Obama warned that “even a successful war against Iraq will require a U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences.”

And when he became a US Senator he continued to oppose the war. In 2007, Obama introduced a bill, “Iraq War De-Escalation Act of 2007.” The bill was designed to stop Bush’s proposed troop surge and to begin a phased redeployment of US forces out of Iraq. It was referred to committee, but failed to become law.

In 2008, Obama campaigned heavily on ending the war. When he took over as president on January 20, 2009, Obama issued presidential memoranda and executive orders for the military to develop a plan to end the war.

Sarah Palin

Sarah Palin

But now, conservatives are claiming that the withdrawal of troops by Obama is proof that Bush’s “troop surge” worked and that Obama’s taking credit for his predecessor’s success. Sarah Palin tweeted that Obama is a failed leader who opposed the troop surge and isn’t giving “credit where credit’s due. Credit due GW, McCain, troops.”

While Palin is correct that Obama did oppose Bush’s “troop surge” tactic, however, the troops are leaving Iraq not because the war has been won, but because of a 2008 Statement of Forces Agreement between the US and Iraq.

Article 24 of the agreement says, “All the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.”

And this phased draw down of combat operations has been ongoing since last year.

“All United States combat forces shall withdraw from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities no later than the time at which Iraqi Security Forces assume full responsibility for security in an Iraqi province, provided that such withdrawal is completed no later than June 30, 2009,” the agreement says.

Violence in Iraq has not subsided, despite the American public’s lack of interest. Just last week dozens of people were killed when a series of bomb attacks rocked Iraq.

So this troop withdrawal doesn’t mean the US won the war. It doesn’t mean that Bush’s troop surge “worked.” It doesn’t mean anything other than that the government of Iraq wants all occupation forces out of Iraq by the end of next year. Keep that in mind when you listen to politicians and talking heads boast about victory in Iraq. And don’t forget about the more than $1 trillion the war cost taxpayers now and for generations to come.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq
On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization
of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq

Preamble

The United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, referred to hereafter as “the Parties´´:

Recognizing the importance of: strengthening their joint security, contributing to world peace and stability, combating terrorism in Iraq, and cooperating in the security and defense spheres, thereby deterring aggression and threats against the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Iraq and against its democratic, federal, and constitutional system;

Affirming that such cooperation is based on full respect for the sovereignty of each of them in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter;

Out of a desire to reach a common understanding that strengthens cooperation between them;

Without prejudice to Iraqi sovereignty over its territory, waters, and airspace; and

Pursuant to joint undertakings as two sovereign, independent, and coequal countries;

Have agreed to the following:

Article 1—Scope and Purpose

This Agreement shall determine the principal provisions and requirements that regulate the temporary presence, activities, and withdrawal of the United States Forces from Iraq.

Article 2—Definition of Terms

1. “Agreed facilities and areas´´ are those Iraqi facilities and areas owned by the Government of Iraq that are in use by the United States Forces during the period in which this Agreement is in force.
2. “United States Forces´´ means the entity comprising the members of the United States Armed Forces, their associated civilian component, and all property, equipment, and materiel of the United States Armed Forces present in the territory of Iraq.
3. “Member of the United States Forces´´ means any individual who is a member of the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard.
4. “Member of the civilian component´´ means any civilian employed by the United States Department of Defense. This term does not include individuals normally resident in Iraq.
5. “United States contractors´´ and “United States contractor employees´´ mean non-Iraqi persons or legal entities, and their employees, who are citizens of the United States or a third country and who are in Iraq to supply goods, services, and security in Iraq to or on behalf of the United States Forces under a contract or subcontract with or for the United States Forces. However, the terms do not include persons or legal entities normally resident in the territory of Iraq.
6. “Official vehicles´´ means commercial vehicles that may be modified for security purposes and are basically designed for movement on various roads and designated for transportation of personnel.
7. “Military vehicles´´ means all types of vehicles used by the United States Forces, which were originally designated for use in combat operations and display special distinguishing numbers and symbols according to applicable United States Forces instructions and regulations.
8. “Defense equipment´´ means systems, weapons, supplies, equipment, munitions, and materials exclusively used in conventional warfare that are required by the United States Forces in connection with agreed activities under this Agreement and are not related, either directly or indirectly, to systems of weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, biological weapons, and related waste of such weapons).
9. “Storage´´ means the keeping of defense equipment required by the United States Forces in connection with agreed activities under this Agreement.
10. “Taxes and duties´´ means all taxes, duties (including customs duties), fees, of whatever kind, imposed by the Government of Iraq, or its agencies, or governorates under Iraqi laws and regulations. However, the term does not include charges by the Government of Iraq, its agencies, or governorates for services requested and received by the United States Forces.

Article 3—Laws

1. While conducting military operations pursuant to this Agreement, it is the duty of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component to respect Iraqi laws, customs, traditions, and conventions and to refrain from any activities that are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of this Agreement. It is the duty of the United States to take all necessary measures for this purpose.
2. With the exception of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component, the United States Forces may not transfer any person into or out of Iraq on vehicles, vessels, or aircraft covered by this Agreement, unless in accordance with applicable Iraqi laws and regulations, including implementing arrangements as may be agreed to by the Government of Iraq.

Article 4—Missions

1. The Government of Iraq requests the temporary assistance of the United States Forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its efforts to maintain security and stability in Iraq, including cooperation in the conduct of operations against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, outlaw groups, and remnants of the former regime.
2. All such military operations that are carried out pursuant to this Agreement shall be conducted with the agreement of the Government of Iraq. Such operations shall be fully coordinated with Iraqi authorities. The coordination of all such military operations shall be overseen by a Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee (JMOCC) to be established pursuant to this Agreement. Issues regarding proposed military operations that cannot be resolved by the JMOCC shall be forwarded to the Joint Ministerial Committee.
3. All such operations shall be conducted with full respect for the Iraqi Constitution and the laws of Iraq. Execution of such operations shall not infringe upon the sovereignty of Iraq and its national interests, as defined by the Government of Iraq. It is the duty of the United States Forces to respect the laws, customs, and traditions of Iraq and applicable international law.
4. The Parties shall continue their efforts to cooperate to strengthen Iraq’s security capabilities including, as may be mutually agreed, on training, equipping, supporting, supplying, and establishing and upgrading logistical systems, including transportation, housing, and supplies for Iraqi Security Forces.
5. The Parties retain the right to legitimate self defense within Iraq, as defined in applicable international law.

Article 5—Property Ownership

1. Iraq owns all buildings, non-relocatable structures, and assemblies connected to the soil that exist on agreed facilities and areas, including those that are used, constructed, altered, or improved by the United States Forces.
2. Upon their withdrawal, the United States Forces shall return to the Government of Iraq all the facilities and areas provided for the use of the combat forces of the United States, based on two lists. The first list of agreed facilities and areas shall take effect upon the entry into force of the Agreement. The second list shall take effect no later than June 30, 2009, the date for the withdrawal of combat forces from the cities, villages, and localities. The Government of Iraq may agree to allow the United States Forces the use of some necessary facilities for the purposes of this Agreement on withdrawal.
3. The United States shall bear all costs for construction, alterations, or improvements in the agreed facilities and areas provided for its exclusive use. The United States Forces shall consult with the Government of Iraq regarding such construction, alterations, and improvements, and must seek approval of the Government of Iraq for major construction and alteration projects. In the event that the use of agreed facilities and areas is shared, the two Parties shall bear the costs of construction, alterations, or improvements proportionately.
4. The United States shall be responsible for paying the costs for services requested and received in the agreed facilities and areas exclusively used by it, and both Parties shall be proportionally responsible for paying the costs for services requested and received in joint agreed facilities and areas.
5. Upon the discovery of any historical or cultural site or finding any strategic resource in agreed facilities and areas, all works of construction, upgrading, or modification shall cease immediately and the Iraqi representatives at the Joint Committee shall be notified to determine appropriate steps in that regard.
6. The United States shall return agreed facilities and areas and any non-relocatable structures and assemblies on them that it had built, installed, or established during the term of this Agreement, according to mechanisms and priorities set forth by the Joint Committee. Such facilities and areas shall be handed over to the Government of Iraq free of any debts and financial burdens.
7. The United States Forces shall return to the Government of Iraq the agreed facilities and areas that have heritage, moral, and political significance and any non-relocatable structures and assemblies on them that it had built, installed, or established, according to mechanisms, priorities, and a time period as mutually agreed by the Joint Committee, free of any debts or financial burdens.
8. The United States Forces shall return the agreed facilities and areas to the Government of Iraq upon the expiration or termination of this Agreement, or earlier as mutually agreed by the Parties, or when such facilities are no longer required as determined by the JMOCC, free of any debts or financial burdens.
9. The United States Forces and United States contractors shall retain title to all equipment, materials, supplies, relocatable structures, and other movable property that was legitimately imported into or legitimately acquired within the territory of Iraq in connection with this Agreement.

Article 6—Use of Agreed Facilities and Areas

1. With full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq, and as part of exchanging views between the Parties pursuant to this Agreement, Iraq grants access and use of agreed facilities and areas to the United States Forces, United States contractors, United States contractor employees, and other individuals or entities as agreed upon by the Parties.
2. In accordance with this Agreement, Iraq authorizes the United States Forces to exercise within the agreed facilities and areas all rights and powers that may be necessary to establish, use, maintain, and secure such agreed facilities and areas. The Parties shall coordinate and cooperate regarding exercising these rights and powers in the agreed facilities and areas of joint use.
3. The United States Forces shall assume control of entry to agreed facilities and areas that have been provided for its exclusive use. The Parties shall coordinate the control of entry into agreed facilities and areas for joint use and in accordance with mechanisms set forth by the JMOCC. The Parties shall coordinate guard duties in areas adjacent to agreed facilities and areas through the JMOCC.

Article 7—Positioning and Storage of Defense Equipment

The United States Forces may place within agreed facilities and areas and in other temporary locations agreed upon by the Parties defense equipment, supplies, and materials that are required by the United States Forces in connection with agreed activities under this Agreement. The use and storage of such equipment shall be proportionate to the temporary missions of the United States Forces in Iraq pursuant to Article 4 of this Agreement and shall not be related, either directly or indirectly, to systems of weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, biological weapons, and related waste of such weapons). The United States Forces shall control the use and relocation of defense equipment that they own and are stored in Iraq. The United States Forces shall ensure that no storage depots for explosives or munitions are near residential areas, and they shall remove such materials stored therein. The United States shall provide the Government of Iraq with essential information on the numbers and types of such stocks.

Article 8—Protecting the Environment

Both Parties shall implement this Agreement in a manner consistent with protecting the natural environment and human health and safety. The United States reaffirms its commitment to respecting applicable Iraqi environmental laws, regulations, and standards in the course of executing its policies for the purposes of implementing this Agreement.

Article 9—Movement of Vehicles, Vessels, and Aircraft

1. With full respect for the relevant rules of land and maritime safety and movement, vessels and vehicles operated by or at the time exclusively for the United States Forces may enter, exit, and move within the territory of Iraq for the purposes of implementing this Agreement. The JMOCC shall develop appropriate procedures and rules to facilitate and regulate the movement of vehicles.
2. With full respect for relevant rules of safety in aviation and air navigation, United States Government aircraft and civil aircraft that are at the time operating exclusively under a contract with the United States Department of Defense are authorized to over-fly, conduct airborne refueling exclusively for the purposes of implementing this Agreement over, and land and take off within, the territory of Iraq for the purposes of implementing this Agreement. The Iraqi authorities shall grant the aforementioned aircraft permission every year to land in and take off from Iraqi territory exclusively for the purposes of implementing this Agreement. United States Government aircraft and civil aircraft that are at the time operating exclusively under a contract with the United States Department of Defense, vessels, and vehicles shall not have any party boarding them without the consent of the authorities of the United States Forces. The Joint Sub-Committee concerned with this matter shall take appropriate action to facilitate the regulation of such traffic.
3. Surveillance and control over Iraqi airspace shall transfer to Iraqi authority immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement.
4. Iraq may request from the United States Forces temporary support for the Iraqi authorities in the mission of surveillance and control of Iraqi air space.
5. United States Government aircraft and civil aircraft that are at the time operating exclusively under contract to the United States Department of Defense shall not be subject to payment of any taxes, duties, fees, or similar charges, including overflight or navigation fees, landing, and parking fees at government airfields. Vehicles and vessels owned or operated by or at the time exclusively for the United States Forces shall not be subject to payment of any taxes, duties, fees, or similar charges, including for vessels at government ports. Such vehicles, vessels, and aircraft shall be free from registration requirements within Iraq.
6. The United States Forces shall pay fees for services requested and received.
7. Each Party shall provide the other with maps and other available information on the location of mine fields and other obstacles that can hamper or jeopardize movement within the territory and waters of Iraq.

Article 10—Contracting Procedures

The United States Forces may select contractors and enter into contracts in accordance with United States law for the purchase of materials and services in Iraq, including services of construction and building. The United States Forces shall contract with Iraqi suppliers of materials and services to the extent feasible when their bids are competitive and constitute best value. The United States Forces shall respect Iraqi law when contracting with Iraqi suppliers and contractors and shall provide Iraqi authorities with the names of Iraqi suppliers and contractors, and the amounts of relevant contracts.

Article 11—Services and Communications

1. The United States Forces may produce and provide water, electricity, and other services to agreed facilities and areas in coordination with the Iraqi authorities through the Joint Sub-Committee concerned with this matter.
2. The Government of Iraq owns all frequencies. Pertinent Iraqi authorities shall allocate to the United States Forces such frequencies as coordinated by both Parties through the JMOCC. The United States Forces shall return frequencies allocated to them at the end of their use not later than the termination of this Agreement.
3. The United States Forces shall operate their own telecommunications systems in a manner that fully respects the Constitution and laws of Iraq and in accordance with the definition of the term “telecommunications” contained in the Constitution of the International Union of Telecommunications of 1992, including the right to use necessary means and services of their own systems to ensure the full capability to operate systems of telecommunications.
4. For the purposes of this Agreement, the United States Forces are exempt from the payment of fees to use transmission airwaves and existing and future frequencies, including any administrative fees or any other related charges.
5. The United States Forces must obtain the consent of the Government of Iraq regarding any projects of infrastructure for communications that are made outside agreed facilities and areas exclusively for the purposes of this Agreement in accordance with Article 4, except in the case of actual combat operations conducted pursuant to Article 4.
6. The United States Forces shall use telecommunications systems exclusively for the purposes of this Agreement.

Article 12—Jurisdiction

Recognizing Iraq’s sovereign right to determine and enforce the rules of criminal and civil law in its territory, in light of Iraq’s request for temporary assistance from the United States Forces set forth in Article 4, and consistent with the duty of the members of the United States Forces and the civilian component to respect Iraqi laws, customs, traditions, and conventions, the Parties have agreed as follows:

1. Iraq shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component for the grave premeditated felonies enumerated pursuant to paragraph 8, when such crimes are committed outside agreed facilities and areas and outside duty status.
2. Iraq shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United States contractors and United States contractor employees.
3. The United States shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component for matters arising inside agreed facilities and areas; during duty status outside agreed facilities and areas; and in circumstances not covered by paragraph 1.
4. At the request of either Party, the Parties shall assist each other in the investigation of incidents and the collection and exchange of evidence to ensure the due course of justice.
5. Members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component arrested or detained by Iraqi authorities shall be notified immediately to United States Forces authorities and handed over to them within 24 hours from the time of detention or arrest. Where Iraq exercises jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, custody of an accused member of the United States Forces or of the civilian component shall reside with United States Forces authorities. United States Forces authorities shall make such accused persons available to the Iraqi authorities for purposes of investigation and trial.
6. The authorities of either Party may request the authorities of the other Party to waive its primary right to jurisdiction in a particular case. The Government of Iraq agrees to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph 1 above, only after it has determined and notifies the United States in writing within 21 days of the discovery of an alleged offense, that it is of particular importance that such jurisdiction be exercised.
7. Where the United States exercises jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component shall be entitled to due process standards and protections pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States. Where the offense arising under paragraph 3 of this Article may involve a victim who is not a member of the United States Forces or of the civilian component, the Parties shall establish procedures through the Joint Committee to keep such persons informed as appropriate of: the status of the investigation of the crime; the bringing of charges against a suspected offender; the scheduling of court proceedings and the results of plea negotiations; opportunity to be heard at public sentencing proceedings, and to confer with the attorney for the prosecution in the case; and, assistance with filing a claim under Article 21 of this Agreement. As mutually agreed by the Parties, United States Forces authorities shall seek to hold the trials of such cases inside Iraq. If the trial of such cases is to be conducted in the United States, efforts will be undertaken to facilitate the personal attendance of the victim at the trial.
8. Where Iraq exercises jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component shall be entitled to due process standards and protections consistent with those available under United States and Iraqi law. The Joint Committee shall establish procedures and mechanisms for implementing this Article, including an enumeration of the grave premeditated felonies that are subject to paragraph 1 and procedures that meet such due process standards and protections. Any exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article may proceed only in accordance with these procedures and mechanisms.
9. Pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, United States Forces authorities shall certify whether an alleged offense arose during duty status. In those cases where Iraqi authorities believe the circumstances require a review of this determination, the Parties shall consult immediately through the Joint Committee, and United States Forces authorities shall take full account of the facts and circumstances and any information Iraqi authorities may present bearing on the determination by United States Forces authorities.
10. The Parties shall review the provisions of this Article every 6 months including by considering any proposed amendments to this Article taking into account the security situation in Iraq, the extent to which the United States Forces in Iraq are engaged in military operations, the growth and development of the Iraqi judicial system, and changes in United States and Iraqi law.

Article 13—Carrying Weapons and Apparel

Members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component may possess and carry weapons that are owned by the United States while in Iraq according to the authority granted to them under orders and according to their requirements and duties. Members of the United States Forces may also wear uniforms during duty in Iraq.

Article 14—Entry and Exit

1. For purposes of this Agreement, members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component may enter and leave Iraq through official places of embarkation and debarkation requiring only identification cards and travel orders issued for them by the United States. The Joint Committee shall assume the task of setting up a mechanism and a process of verification to be carried out by pertinent Iraqi authorities.
2. Iraqi authorities shall have the right to inspect and verify the lists of names of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component entering and leaving Iraq directly through the agreed facilities and areas. Said lists shall be submitted to Iraqi authorities by the United States Forces. For purposes of this Agreement, members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component may enter and leave Iraq through agreed facilities and areas requiring only identification cards issued for them by the United States. The Joint Committee shall assume the task of setting up a mechanism and a process for inspecting and verifying the validity of these documents.

Article 15—Import and Export

1. For the exclusive purposes of implementing this Agreement, the United States Forces and United States contractors may import, export (items bought in Iraq), re-export, transport, and use in Iraq any equipment, supplies, materials, and technology, provided that the materials imported or brought in by them are not banned in Iraq as of the date this Agreement enters into force. The importation, re-exportation, transportation, and use of such items shall not be subject to any inspections, licenses, or other restrictions, taxes, customs duties, or any other charges imposed in Iraq, as defined in Article 2, paragraph 10. United States Forces authorities shall provide to relevant Iraqi authorities an appropriate certification that such items are being imported by the United States Forces or United States contractors for use by the United States Forces exclusively for the purposes of this Agreement. Based on security information that becomes available, Iraqi authorities have the right to request the United States Forces to open in their presence any container in which such items are being imported in order to verify its contents. In making such a request, Iraqi authorities shall honor the security requirements of the United States Forces and, if requested to do so by the United States Forces, shall make such verifications in facilities used by the United States Forces. The exportation of Iraqi goods by the United States Forces and United States contractors shall not be subject to inspections or any restrictions other than licensing requirements. The Joint Committee shall work with the Iraqi Ministry of Trade to expedite license requirements consistent with Iraqi law for the export of goods purchased in Iraq by the United States Forces for the purposes of this Agreement. Iraq has the right to demand review of any issues arising out of this paragraph. The Parties shall consult immediately in such cases through the Joint Committee or, if necessary, the Joint Ministerial Committee.
2. Members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component may import into Iraq, re-export, and use personal effect materials and equipment for consumption or personal use. The import into, re-export from, transfer from, and use of such imported items in Iraq shall not be subjected to licenses, other restrictions, taxes, custom duties, or any other charges imposed in Iraq, as defined in Article 2, paragraph 10. The imported quantities shall be reasonable and proportionate to personal use. United States Forces authorities will take measures to ensure that no items or material of cultural or historic significance to Iraq are being exported.
3. Any inspections of materials pursuant to paragraph 2 by Iraqi authorities must be done urgently in an agreed upon place and according to procedures established by the Joint Committee.
4. Any material imported free of customs and fees in accordance with this Agreement shall be subjected to taxes and customs and fees as defined in Article 2, paragraph 10, or any other fees valued at the time of sale in Iraq, upon sale to individuals and entities not covered by tax exemption or special import privileges. Such taxes and fees (including custom duties) shall be paid by the transferee for the items sold.
5. Materials referred to in the paragraphs of this Article must not be imported or used for commercial purposes.

Article 16—Taxes

1. Any taxes, duties, or fees as defined in Article 2, paragraph 10, with their value determined and imposed in the territory of Iraq, shall not be imposed on goods and services purchased by or on behalf of the United States Forces in Iraq for official use or on goods and services that have been purchased in Iraq on behalf of the United States Forces.
2. Members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component shall not be responsible for payment of any tax, duty, or fee that has its value determined and imposed in the territory of Iraq, unless in return for services requested and received.

Article 17—Licenses or Permits

1. Valid driver’s licenses issued by United States authorities to members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component, and to United States contractor employees, shall be deemed acceptable to Iraqi authorities. Such license holders shall not be subject to a test or fee for operating the vehicles, vessels, and aircraft belonging to the United States Forces in Iraq.
2. Valid driver’s licenses issued by United States authorities to members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component, and to United States contractor employees, to operate personal cars within the territory of Iraq shall be deemed acceptable to Iraqi authorities. License holders shall not be subject to a test or fee.
3. All professional licenses issued by United States authorities to members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component, and to United States contractor employees shall be deemed valid by Iraqi authorities, provided such licenses are related to the services they provide within the framework of performing their official duties for or contracts in support of the United States Forces, members of the civilian component, United States contractors, and United States contractor employees, according to terms agreed upon by the Parties.

Article 18—Official and Military Vehicles

1. Official vehicles shall display official Iraqi license plates to be agreed upon between the Parties. Iraqi authorities shall, at the request of the authorities of the United States Forces, issue registration plates for official vehicles of the United States Forces without fees, according to procedures used for the Iraqi Armed Forces. The authorities of the United States Forces shall pay to Iraqi authorities the cost of such plates.
2. Valid registration and licenses issued by United States authorities for official vehicles of the United States Forces shall be deemed acceptable by Iraqi authorities.
3. Military vehicles exclusively used by the United States Forces will be exempted from the requirements of registration and licenses, and they shall be clearly marked with numbers on such vehicles.

Article 19—Support Activities Services

1. The United States Forces, or others acting on behalf of the United States Forces, may assume the duties of establishing and administering activities and entities inside agreed facilities and areas, through which they can provide services for members of the United States Forces, the civilian component, United States contractors, and United States contractor employees. These entities and activities include military post offices; financial services; shops selling food items, medicine, and other commodities and services; and various areas to provide entertainment and telecommunications services, including radio broadcasts. The establishment of such services does not require permits.
2. Broadcasting, media, and entertainment services that reach beyond the scope of the agreed facilities and areas shall be subject to Iraqi laws.
3. Access to the Support Activities Services shall be limited to members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component, United States contractors, United States contractor employees, and other persons and entities that are agreed upon. The authorities of the United States Forces shall take appropriate actions to prevent misuse of the services provided by the mentioned activities, and prevent the sale or resale of aforementioned goods and services to persons not authorized access to these entities or to benefit from their services. The United States Forces will determine broadcasting and television programs to authorized recipients.
4. The service support entities and activities referred to in this Article shall be granted the same financial and customs exemptions granted to the United States Forces, including exemptions guaranteed in Articles 15 and 16 of this Agreement. These entities and activities that offer services shall be operated and managed in accordance with United States regulations; these entities and activities shall not be obligated to collect nor pay taxes or other fees related to the activities in connection with their operations.
5. The mail sent through the military post service shall be certified by United States Forces authorities and shall be exempt from inspection, search, and seizure by Iraqi authorities, except for non-official mail that may be subject to electronic observation. Questions arising in the course of implementation of this paragraph shall be addressed by the concerned Joint Sub-Committee and resolved by mutual agreement. The concerned Joint Sub-Committee shall periodically inspect the mechanisms by which the United States Forces authorities certify military mail.

Article 20—Currency and foreign exchange

1. The United States Forces shall have the right to use any amount of cash in United States currency or financial instruments with a designated value in United States currency exclusively for the purposes of this Agreement. Use of Iraqi currency and special banks by the United States Forces shall be in accordance with Iraqi laws.
2. The United States Forces may not export Iraqi currency from Iraq, and shall take measures to ensure that members of the United States Forces, of the civilian component, and United States contractors and United States contractor employees do not export Iraqi currency from Iraq.

Article 21—Claims

1. With the exception of claims arising from contracts, each Party shall waive the right to claim compensation against the other Party for any damage, loss, or destruction of property, or compensation for injuries or deaths that could happen to members of the force or civilian component of either Party arising out of the performance of their official duties in Iraq.
2. United States Forces authorities shall pay just and reasonable compensation in settlement of meritorious third party claims arising out of acts, omissions, or negligence of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component done in the performance of their official duties and incident to the non-combat activities of the United States Forces. United States Forces authorities may also settle meritorious claims not arising from the performance of official duties. All claims in this paragraph shall be settled expeditiously in accordance with the laws and regulations of the United States. In settling claims, United States Forces authorities shall take into account any report of investigation or opinion regarding liability or amount of damages issued by Iraqi authorities.
3. Upon the request of either Party, the Parties shall consult immediately through the Joint Committee or, if necessary, the Joint Ministerial Committee, where issues referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above require review.

Article 22—Detention

1. No detention or arrest may be carried out by the United States Forces (except with respect to detention or arrest of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component) except through an Iraqi decision issued in accordance with Iraqi law and pursuant to Article 4.
2. In the event the United States Forces detain or arrest persons as authorized by this Agreement or Iraqi law, such persons must be handed over to competent Iraqi authorities within 24 hours from the time of their detention or arrest.
3. The Iraqi authorities may request assistance from the United States Forces in detaining or arresting wanted individuals.
4. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the United States Forces shall provide to the Government of Iraq available information on all detainees who are being held by them. Competent Iraqi authorities shall issue arrest warrants for persons who are wanted by them. The United States Forces shall act in full and effective coordination with the Government of Iraq to turn over custody of such wanted detainees to Iraqi authorities pursuant to a valid Iraqi arrest warrant and shall release all the remaining detainees in a safe and orderly manner, unless otherwise requested by the Government of Iraq and in accordance with Article 4 of this Agreement.
5. The United States Forces may not search houses or other real estate properties except by order of an Iraqi judicial warrant and in full coordination with the Government of Iraq, except in the case of actual combat operations conducted pursuant to Article 4.

Article 23—Implementation

Implementation of this Agreement and the settlement of disputes arising from the interpretation and application thereof shall be vested in the following bodies:

1. A Joint Ministerial Committee shall be established with participation at the Ministerial level determined by both Parties. The Joint Ministerial Committee shall deal with issues that are fundamental to the interpretation and implementation of this Agreement.
2. The Joint Ministerial Committee shall establish a JMOCC consisting of representatives from both Parties. The JMOCC shall be co-chaired by representatives of each Party.
3. . The Joint Ministerial Committee shall also establish a Joint Committee consisting of representatives to be determined by both Parties. The Joint Committee shall be cochaired by representatives of each Party, and shall deal with all issues related to this Agreement outside the exclusive competence of the JMOCC.
4. In accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, the Joint Committee shall establish Joint Sub-Committees in different areas to consider the issues arising under this Agreement according to their competencies.

Article 24—Withdrawal of the United States Forces from Iraq

Recognizing the performance and increasing capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces, the assumption of full security responsibility by those Forces, and based upon the strong relationship between the Parties, an agreement on the following has been reached:

1. All the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.
2. All United States combat forces shall withdraw from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities no later than the time at which Iraqi Security Forces assume full responsibility for security in an Iraqi province, provided that such withdrawal is completed no later than June 30, 2009.
3. United States combat forces withdrawn pursuant to paragraph 2 above shall be stationed in the agreed facilities and areas outside cities, villages, and localities to be designated by the JMOCC before the date established in paragraph 2 above.
4. The United States recognizes the sovereign right of the Government of Iraq to request the departure of the United States Forces from Iraq at any time. The Government of Iraq recognizes the sovereign right of the United States to withdraw the United States Forces from Iraq at any time.
5. The Parties agree to establish mechanisms and arrangements to reduce the number of the United States Forces during the periods of time that have been determined, and they shall agree on the locations where the United States Forces will be present.

Article 25—Measures to Terminate the Application of Chapter VII to Iraq

Acknowledging the right of the Government of Iraq not to request renewal of the Chapter VII authorization for and mandate of the multinational forces contained in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1790 (2007) that ends on December 31, 2008;
Taking note of the letters to the UN Security Council from the Prime Minister of Iraq andthe Secretary of State of the United States dated December 7 and December 10, 2007, respectively, which are annexed to Resolution 1790;
Taking note of section 3 of the Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship, signed by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Iraq on November 26, 2007, which memorialized Iraq’s call for extension of the above-mentioned mandate for a final period, to end not later than December 31, 2008:
Recognizing also the dramatic and positive developments in Iraq, and noting that the situation in Iraq is fundamentally different than that which existed when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 661 in 1990, and in particular that the threat to international peace and security posed by the Government of Iraq no longer exists, the Parties affirm in this regard that with the termination on December 31, 2008 of the Chapter VII mandate and authorization for the multinational force contained in Resolution 1790, Iraq should return to the legal and international standing that it enjoyed prior to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 661 (1990), and that the United States shall use its best efforts to help Iraq take the steps necessary to achieve this by December 31, 2008.

Article 26—Iraqi Assets

1. To enable Iraq to continue to develop its national economy through the rehabilitation of its economic infrastructure, as well as providing necessary essential services to the Iraqi people, and to continue to safeguard Iraq’s revenues from oil and gas and other Iraqi resources and its financial and economic assets located abroad, including the Development Fund for Iraq, the United States shall ensure maximum efforts to:
1. Support Iraq to obtain forgiveness of international debt resulting from the policies of the former regime.
2. Support Iraq to achieve a comprehensive and final resolution of outstanding reparation claims inherited from the previous regime, including compensation requirements imposed by the UN Security Council on Iraq.
2. Recognizing and understanding Iraq’s concern with claims based on actions perpetrated by the former regime, the President of the United States has exercised his authority to protect from United States judicial process the Development Fund for Iraq and certain other property in which Iraq has an interest. The United States shall remain fully and actively engaged with the Government of Iraq with respect to continuation of such protections and with respect to such claims.
3. Consistent with a letter from the President of the United States to be sent to the Prime Minister of Iraq, the United States remains committed to assist Iraq in connection with its request that the UN Security Council extend the protections and other arrangements established in Resolution 1483 (2003) and Resolution 1546 (2004) for petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas originating in Iraq, proceeds and obligations from sale thereof, and the Development Fund for Iraq.

Article 27—Deterrence of Security Threats

In order to strengthen security and stability in Iraq and to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability, the Parties shall work actively to strengthen the political and military capabilities of the Republic of Iraq to deter threats against its sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and its constitutional federal democratic system. To that end, the Parties agree as follows:

1. In the event of any external or internal threat or aggression against Iraq that would violate its sovereignty, political independence, or territorial integrity, waters, airspace, its democratic system or its elected institutions, and upon request by the Government of Iraq, the Parties shall immediately initiate strategic deliberations and, as may be mutually agreed, the United States shall take appropriate measures, including diplomatic, economic, or military measures, or any other measure, to deter such a threat.
2. The Parties agree to continue close cooperation in strengthening and maintaining military and security institutions and democratic political institutions in Iraq, including, as may be mutually agreed, cooperation in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi Security Forces, in order to combat domestic and international terrorism and outlaw groups, upon request by the Government of Iraq.
3. Iraqi land, sea, and air shall not be used as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries.

Article 28—The Green Zone

Upon entry into force of this Agreement the Government of Iraq shall have full responsibility for the Green Zone. The Government of Iraq may request from the United States Forces limited and temporary support for the Iraqi authorities in the mission of security for the Green Zone. Upon such request, relevant Iraqi authorities shall work jointly with the United States Forces authorities on security for the Green Zone during the period determined by the Government of Iraq.

Article 29—Implementing Mechanisms

Whenever the need arises, the Parties shall establish appropriate mechanisms for implementation of Articles of this Agreement, including those that do not contain specific implementation mechanisms.

Article 30—The Period for which the Agreement is Effective

1. This Agreement shall be effective for a period of three years, unless terminated sooner by either Party pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article.
2. This Agreement shall be amended only with the official agreement of the Parties in writing and in accordance with the constitutional procedures in effect in both countries.
3. This Agreement shall terminate one year after a Party provides written notification to the other Party to that effect.
4. This Agreement shall enter into force on January 1, 2009, following an exchange of diplomatic notes confirming that the actions by the Parties necessary to bring the Agreement into force in accordance with each Party’s respective constitutional procedures have been completed.

Signed in duplicate in Baghdad on this 17th day of November, 2008, in the English and Arabic languages, each text being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ:

Iraqi Eye Witness to July 12, 2007 Massacre

Iraqi Eye Witness to July 12, 2007 Massacre

More information is coming out about the US military massacre in the Baghdad neighborhood of New Baghdad documented by the newly release WikiLeaks video.

Rick Rowley is an independent journalist with Big Noise Films. One of the few journalists not embedded with a military unit, Rowley was in Baghdad on July 12, 2007 when US Apache helicopters slaughtered innocent Iraqi civilians and two Reuters staff members.

When WikiLeaks released US military footage of the bloodbath on Monday, Rowley realized that he had interviewed eye witnesses to this event the day after the shooting.

According to the witnesses, what happened was that when the Reuters journalist arrived, several men from the neighborhood gathered around him to try and get him to help them get cooking oil and other supplies. From my experience, that’s a common reaction in impoverished communities at seeing a journalist, because people believe that the reporter can be of some help.

So these men were not “insurgents,” but rather innocent Iraqis looking for help.

Rick Rowley Big Noise Films

Rick Rowley Big Noise Films

Remember, this was 2007 when Baghdad was being ripped apart by civil war. This also explains why at least two of the men in the WikiLeaks video had AK-47s. As Rowley says during the interview with Democracy Now, every household is allowed to possess an AK-47, and when civil war broke out, neighbors formed armed defense forces to protect their families and neighborhoods. In other words, not everyone with a gun is an insurgent.

What’s also alarming about Rowley’s eye witness interviews is that the man the US military drove over with a tank after the shooting stopped was alive at the time. In the audio you can hear the US soldiers laughing when the tank runs over this wounded Iraqi.

Gawker ran a story about Reuters spiking their own coverage of the WikiLeaks video here.

Here’s the WikiLeaks video released on Monday. This is very graphic and will likely ruin your day.

Wikileaks Video of Iraqi Civilian Deaths

Wikileaks Video of Iraqi Civilian Deaths

The reaction to the video of US soldiers callously gunning down 12 people, including two Reuters employees, in Baghdad has been overwhelmingly shock and aw.

One Youtuber said, “This video has seriously got me ‘shooting’ vulgarities! They thought they are playing some kind of arcade game. … They are lives for goodness sake!”

During and after the slaughter, the US soldiers revel in their kills.

“Look at those dead bastards,” one pilot says. “Nice,” the other responds.

Wikileaks Video of Iraqi Civilian Deaths

But not everyone has been so quick to condemn the soldiers’ actions.

“U gotta put this in the right context,” a YouTuber said. “Sure it’s sad but Iraq was in real shit back then. People died every day in bloody street battles. For all we know the reporter could have been giving information to the terrorists. We will never know.”

There’s no evidence that Reuter’s photojournalist Namir Noor-Eldeen, 22, or his assistant Saeed Chmagh, 40, was working with the insurgents, or whether the men they were standing near were insurgents, but that hasn’t stopped several people to question these dead men’s character. And in this post-modern world we live in, this type of watercooler banter is now broadcast on YouTube and Twitter – completely devoid of any fact, nonetheless disparaging those men who were killed on July 12, 2007.

The New York Times reporter Elizabeth Bumiller reported that “Reuters said at the time that the two men had been working on a report about weightlifting when they heard about a military raid in the neighborhood, and decided to drive there to check it out.

‘There had been reports of clashes between U.S. forces and insurgents in the area but there was no fighting on the streets in which Namir was moving about with a group of men,’ Reuters wrote in 2008. ‘It is believed two or three of these men may have been carrying weapons, although witnesses said none were assuming a hostile posture at the time.’”

These killings and the pro-American response to it on YouTube is doing nothing but solidifying anti-American sentiment around the globe.

“I see here Americans defending what they saw here,” a YouTuber said. “I can’t understand how you guys can do that, really. You have become a sick nation! Shame on you all.”

What gets lost in the shock of watching this video is that what we’re watching isn’t unusual in a war. In Iraq, hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians have been killed, it happens every single day. What’s shocking is that most Americans don’t know, don’t care and simply go about their business as if there’s no war in Iraq.

The US is waging a bloody war in Iraq, and has been for seven years. The lack of reporters further isolates the average American from seeing the horrors of war. This isn’t like Vietnam when we had reporters, not embeds, covering the war. So when we see a video like this, we think, “This is crazy. Those soldiers should be thrown in jail.”

The soldiers are doing what they’re trained to do. They’re doing what we pay them to do. If we don’t want to kill Iraqis anymore, we need to end the war, because this is war and it’s ugly.

Blackwater founder Erik Prince

Blackwater founder Erik Prince

On Wednesday, a federal judge rejected a series of arguments by lawyers for the mercenary firm formerly known as Blackwater seeking to dismiss five high-stakes war crimes cases brought by Iraqi victims against both the company and its owner, Erik Prince. At the same time, Judge TS Ellis III sent the Iraqis’ lawyers back to the legal drawing board to amend and refile their cases, saying that the Iraqi plaintiffs need to provide more specific details on the alleged crimes before a final decision can be made on whether or not the lawsuits will proceed.

Read The Nation’s Jeremy Scahill’s complete story about Blackwater
Read the document archive of the cases against Blackwater

President Barack Obama

President Barack Obama

President Obama continues to make the same mistake over and over again. From bankers, to members of Congress and even the American people, Obama keeps hoping everyone will just get along and find common ground.

While Obama keeps waiting for everyone do to the right thing, unemployment continues to go up, small businesses are struggling or failing, people are dying from lack of health care, the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and bailed out investment bankers are rolling in taxpayer dough.

It’s time for Obama to stop his audacity of hope campaign – what we need is action, leadership and some asses kicked (I’m looking at you Goldman Sachs and AIG).

Perhaps critics of candidate Obama were right when they said he lacked experience. He’s been in the White House for nine months and he’s accomplished nothing.

Health care reform continues to flounder in Congress.

The war in Iraq is still sucking the US Treasury dry and snatching the lives of American soldiers and Iraqi civilians.

In Afghanistan, Obama is thinking about sending more troops, but he appears to be hemming and hawing over that decision.

When the banking industry, which created the current financial mess we’re in thanks to laissez-faire regulation, was on the ropes Obama didn’t take that opportunity to force regulation down their throats, but rather he handed them billions and billions of taxpayer money and hoped that they’d play nice and be cool with regulatory changes later. Wrong.

Before Congress started debating health care reform, the president should have laid out his requirements for a bill he would sign. Obama should have started out with single-payer and made the case for it. There’s a good argument to be made for single-payer, but Obama didn’t even try. Instead, he left it all up to Congress to run wild with and boy did they. Now we’re looking at heavily compromised bills that will likely result in a lot of people paying too much money for health insurance that doesn’t cover anything. Thanks, but no thanks.

And what has he done to end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Nothing. We can’t win either of these wars because there is no definition of victory. No one has ever conquered Afghanistan, and neither will the US. And what’s the exit strategy in Iraq? Hope?

Obama’s hope machine has run out of gas. Hope is great, we all need a little bit of it from time to time, but it’s no excuse for inaction. This is politics. It’s partisan.

The time for leadership is now, because let’s face it, pretending that partisan politics is something that can, or should, be avoided is no recipe for success. Obama needs to stop his wishful thinking. Conservatives and liberals will not march on Washington, DC hand-in-hand singing Kumbaya – it’s not going to happen. Wake up or step aside in 2012 to make room for a real leader.

Blackwater founder Erik Prince

Blackwater founder Erik Prince

On Sept. 9, 2009, another civil case was filed against Blackwater founder Erik Prince for allegedly masterminding a holy war campaign in Iraq to kill Iraqis.

The plaintiffs allege the on Sept. 9, 2007, a Blackwater employee Evan Liberty recklessly drove through the streets of Baghdad firing his weapon without reason or regard to who he was shooting. As a result, one of the defendants was shot in the head, another in the leg and the other two claim “assault by gunfire.”

The complaint states that “Mr. Prince is personally responsible for the assaults on Plaintiffs because Mr. Liberty’s egregious misconduct was not an isolated or aberrational act. Rather, as will be shown by reasonable discovery, Mr. Prince personally directed and permitted a heavily-armed private army, including but not limited to Mr. Liberty, to roam the streets of Baghdad killing innocent civilians.”

This is just one of many cases filed in the US District Court for Eastern District of Virginia. I’ve compiled a reasonably complete archive of the court documents pertaining to these civil cases here.

Regardless of the allegations of murder, conspiracy to commit murder and Prince’s alleged holy war against Islam, President Obama continues to employ Blackwater in Iraq under the name Xe. Here’s a story about that.

A complete listing of all Blackwater related stories is here.

The Courthouse News has a story about the latest here.

The Nation’s Jeremy Scahill’s book “Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army

Private security guards who worked for Blackwater repeatedly shot wildly into the streets of Baghdad without regard for civilians long before they were involved in a 2007 shooting episode that left at least 14 Iraqis dead, federal prosecutors charge in a new court document. Read the entire New York Times story.

Here’s an Alternet story about the media’s unwillingness to press the issue of Blackwater’s war on Islam.

There’s a separate case against Blackwater in Virginia that alleges Erik Prince is waging his own personal crusade against muslims. Here are the court documents relating to the case.

President Obama is ratcheting up the war in Afghanistan with more troops and more money. What the hell is he doing?

There was a story the other day in the Portland Daily Sun about a young soldier killed in Afghanistan. What did he die for? Does Obama really think he’s going to be able to do what Russia couldn’t do when they killed a couple million Afghanis before heading home in 1989 with their tail between their legs?

Bob Herbert said in his column today that the Bush administration screwed up the war in Afghanistan from the get-go and no amount of money and troops is going to salvage it.

Why do we keep doing this? Why do we keep repeating the mistakes of Vietnam? I mean, it wasn’t so long ago that we should have forgotten it already. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have claimed the lives of more than 5,000 US soldiers, hundreds of thousands of civilians and more than a trillion dollars.

It makes no sense. Obama should be ashamed of himself. Every death is on his hands now. He has no excuse. This isn’t change we can believe in. Hope? Whatever.

The State Department has extended a contract with controversial private security firm Blackwater, ABC News has learned. The contract was due to expire this month.

Blackwater founder Erik Prince

Blackwater founder Erik Prince

Sources say the department has agreed to temporarily continue using the subsidiary known as Presidential Airways to provide helicopter transport for embassy employees around Iraq until a new contract with another security company, Dyncorp International, is fully implemented. Presidential Airways is an arm of U.S. Training Center, which is a subsidiary of the company Xe, formerly and still commonly known as Blackwater.

Read this entire story at ABC News

Last Updated Sept. 15, 2009

On Sept. 9, 2009 another civil case has been brought against Erik Prince and his Blackwater corporate mercenary empire. In this case, like the others, Prince is accused of willfully murdering Iraqis for sport. It’s alleged that Prince hires people who will kill for him, essentially waging his own private crusade and murdering innocent Iraqis as part of his war against Islam.

On Aug. 12, 2009, Erik Prince’s lawyer Peter H. White of Mayer Brown LLP, filed a motion to change the defendants in the case from Erik Prince and his Blackwater corporate entities with the US government. The argument is based on the Westfall Act that prevents employees of the federal government from being sued for doing bad things while working for the government. It’s not clear that Blackwater will qualify as an employee of the government since it’s a contractor and not a person. Here’s an analysis of the Westfall Act and whether employees of the government can be held responsible for their actions. Of course, it’s not clear whether Blackwater is considered an employee.

Court Documents Available for Your Review

Please note that most of these are document collections, not just one document. Use the icons at the bottom of the viewer to examine the other associated documents. I tried to put the most important stuff first, but the exhibits and supporting documents are necessary for the complete picture.

Sept. 9, 2009 court documents related another civil case against Prince.

Aug. 12, 2009 motion to make the defendants in this case the US government rather than Prince and his corporations.

Here are some more documents related to the Aug. 12, 2009 court date. This is an updated version of Prince’s motion to dismiss which includes the expert testimony of HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI.

On Aug. 5, 2009 Prince’s lawyer filed this document with the court.
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO ENJOIN EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS REGARDING THIS LITIGATION

Here’s the original complaint filed against Erik Prince and his various companies. Also included are the civil cover sheet and a receipt for the $350 filing fee. The plaintiff is listed as the “Estate of Husain Salih Rabea.”

Here are the documents relating to the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Here’s a memorandum supporting the motion to dismiss the case. Please remember to use the icons at the bottom of the document viewer to see all of the documents.

Here are the documents The Nation published regarding Monday’s declarations by John Doe #1 and John Doe #2. Here’s John Doe #1′s declaration.

Here’s John Doe #2′s declaration.

Update: The judge has ruled against Erik Prince’s motion to stop the plaintiffs’ from speaking about this case publicly.

According to court documents filed by Peter H. White – the lawyer representing Erik Prince and Blackwater -  he continues to push the argument that the plaintiffs’ lawyer should shut up.

The campaign by plaintiffs’ counsel to try this case in the media, and the resulting prejudicial impact on potential jurors, continues apace: in just the 16 days since the filing of defendants’ motion.

White claims Susan L. Burke, the plaintiffs’ lawyer, is trying to try this case in the court of public opinion, with the help of The Nation.

Moreover, the conduct of plaintiffs’ counsel here exhibits precisely the sort of “collaboration between counsel and the press” that the Supreme Court described as “highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures” in Gentile. The article in The Nation entitled “Blackwater Seeks Gag Order,” for example, relies almost exclusively on commentary by plaintiffs’ counsel for its one-sided analysis of the motion to seal the WPPS contracts and of this motion by defendants to prohibit extrajudicial statements.

This motion to put a lid on the plaintiff is the latest document filed in this case, you can view it here.


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Blackwater Gate represents a growing threat to our republic.

The lawsuits developing around Erik Prince and Blackwater could turn into a huge story – much bigger than the lawsuits themselves which involve murder, gun smuggling and a crusade against Islam. If covered effectively by the press, this story could result in real policy change. However, if the press drops the ball again and Pres. Obama takes the path of least resistance, the consequences could be catastrophic.

You see the scariest part of this story isn’t that Prince is waging his own personal crusade against Islam and using Iraq and Afghanistan as his own personal battlefield against Muslims. The most frightening aspect of this story is scarier than the thought that this really isn’t Prince’s “personal” crusade, but rather a widespread conspiracy involving fringe elements of the Catholic church (e.g. The Knights of Malta) and high-ranking members of our own government (e.g former Pres. Bush) to wipe Islam off the planet.

No, what’s so frightening about Blackwater Gate is that this scandal is an indicator that the privatization of our military could be the greatest threat to our democracy today.

It’s possible I’m overstating the threat to our republic, but before you make up your mind that hiring private companies to fight our wars is a great idea, think about the ideology and the people who support privatization.

Outsourcing our military started back when Dick Cheney was the secretary of defense during the 80s. Of course, defense contractors have for years built planes, tanks, guns and bullets, but under Cheney’s direction, they started performing combat duties that used to be done by soldiers.

It’s not difficult to see why Cheney would support the privatization of the military, he undeniably seeks the privatization of every task the government does. Cheney’s rhetorical argument for supporting private businesses over public entities is that the government is incapable of doing anything right – just look at how they bungled 9/11, Katrina, the war in Iraq, Afghanistan and Wall Street. Of course, to buy this argument you have to forget that Cheney was the vice president overseeing all of these debacles.

My cynical side tells me that Cheney couldn’t care less about the efficiency of government compared to corporate america; what Cheney wants to do is move as much money from the public sector to the private sector. Cheney’s not stupid, he knows that money is power and money in the hands of private companies that share his ideology is better than in the hands of a government that probably won’t be as rigidly neo-conservative as he would like. And putting that cash into the bank accounts of a private fighting force is even better.

The war in Iraq is a perfect example Cheney in action. If you think the war is about oil or Saddam Hussein, you’re not paying attention to the details, and you’re not following the money. The war in Iraq will go down in history as the greatest pillaging of the US treasury ever. We’re talking about trillions of dollars, and it’s not going into the wallets of privates and corporals on the front line. For Cheney, “support the troops” really is just a slogan.

In 2007, The Hill reported:

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that one of the issues he’s most concerned about is the way that private contractors in Iraq lure away active-duty members of the military with promises of much higher salaries — often to do more or less the same stuff they’re doing in uniform.

It’s not just about money though. Think about how powerful it would be to have a well-trained fighting force that can gather intelligence and perform combat missions around the globe. To get the US military to wage war requires too much diplomacy and too many members of Congress for Cheney, but a private company like Blackwater, that’s almost too easy.

What’s also cool about hiring mercenaries is that the law governing them is sketchy at best. In Iraq, according to Prince’s motion to dismiss the case against him in the US District Court in Virginia, private contractors have “total immunity.” So it looks like mercenaries don’t have to worry about that annoying Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Geneva Convention or any of those stupid international laws prohibiting torture and violating human rights. Just outsource it.

Well that’s Cheney’s excuse – what’s Obama’s? Why does Obama continue to support the privatization of the military? Why does his administration continue to award Blackwater contracts in Iraq?

Maybe Obama agrees with Cheney, that it’s better to have wars sponsored by corporations that profit from perpetual fighting. These corporations are not held accountable to the people, politicians or anyone. What they chose to do in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the globe is done in our name and at our expense. But to what end?

I know, Obama’s job is difficult and reversing course on privatizing the military is not going to be easy, but so what. He was elected by a landslide campaigning on a message of “change.”


Jeremy Scahill’s book “Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army
Corporate Warriors: The Privatized Military and Iraq
Uniform Code of Military Justice
Blackwater Wiki

Here’s a video by The Nation’s Jeremy Scahill explaining how Bush and Erik Prince, the owner of Blackwater, were working together in Iraq to wage a 21st century crusade against Islam. The video is called “Blackwater: Shadow Army.” You can watch it here.

Scahill also documents in his book “Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army” compelling connections between Prince and shadow elements of the Catholic church such as the Knights of Malta. The Knights of Malta evidently were key players in the original 11th century crusades and supposedly they only answer to the Pope.

Now if we assume that Scahill is correct in his assertion that Bush and Prince were working together, using the “war on terror” as a conduit to wage a modern-day crusade with Prince’s shadow army of mercenaries killing Muslims at will for the purpose of total Christian rule of the planet, what’s Obama’s excuse? Why is Blackwater still operating in Iraq, despite the fact that their contract was not renewed?

Perhaps Obama has allowed Blackwater to continue to operate in Iraq because he too is aligned with Opus Dei Catholic soldiers-of-doom analogous to a character from David Brown’s “The Da Vinci Code.”

Unfortunately I don’t have access to Obama, so I can’t ask him that question, perhaps someone in the White House press corps will, but something tells me I doubt it.

With all the allegations of murder, tax evasion and charges of war crimes flying at Prince and his company, it’s surprising that Obama keeps paying him to put boots on the ground in Iraq, but he does.

Scahill’s most recent story about Blackwater court case in the US District Court in Virginia
Here’s the latest on The Center for Constitutional Rights’ case against Prince and Blackwater.

Wikipedia on Blackwater some of the information here is sketchy.
The Knight of Malta Wikipedia page
Here’s the video of Bush getting laughs for calling the “war on terror” a “crusade”
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